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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CASE NO. 930667-CA

ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, dba
ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., an
Ohio corporation, and
JOHN P. CANNON, individually,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court neglect pertinent elements relating to
Showalter's damages so as to constitute reversal of the trial
court's findings of damages?
2.

What

drilling rig?

is the proper measure

of value of

Showalter's

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The

trial

Showalter's

court

found

that

Plaintiff/Appellant

Robert

("Showalter") damages resulting from the loss of a

drilling rig due to Defendants/Appellees Cannon Structures and John
Cannon's

("Cannon") negligence

to be $97,000.00.

It

is this

finding of the trial court that is the basis of this appeal.

In

fixing damages, the trial court's award will not be set aside
unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial court
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice
or other extraneous circumstances.

Maybe v. Kay Peterson Const.

Co., Inc., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984); See also Gillmor v. Gillmor,
745 P.2d 461, cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah App. 1987); Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares,
210 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, April, 1993.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
California Civil Code Section 3333 (West 1982) (Supp. 1993)
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1987) (Supp. 1993)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a)(b)

(1987) (Supp.

1993)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(5)(6)(7)

(1987)

(Supp. 1993)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(a) (1987) (Supp. 1993)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Showalter
suffered

by

transporting

appeals

Showalter

the

trial

resulting

court's
from

Showalter's drilling rig.
2

finding

Cannon's

of

damages

negligence

The trial court

in

found

Cannon to be one hundred percent at faultf
$97,000.00 in total damages.
rig to Cannon.

awarding Showalter

The court subsequently awarded the

Showalter moved for a new trial on the issue of

damages, claiming that the court's finding was inconsistent with
the evidence adduced at trial. The motion was denied and an appeal
was taken to this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Showalter purchased in 1990 a drilling rig for $87,000.00

plus $10,000.00 for a customs charge.
2.

The drilling

(Tr. at 474.)

rig was unique because

it had

special

features that made it more durable and allowed it to perform
especially difficult drilling operations.

(Tr. at 128, 146, 148,

189, 216, 221, 230.)
3.

Showalter made certain modifications in the amount of

$18,800.00 to the rig to allow for smoother operation.

(Tr. at

152, 449, Exhibit 47 ($6,000.00 payment to Carl Martin for purchase
of drilling augers).)
4. The drilling rig was used on a job in Kayetna, Arizona for
Cannon Structures, John Cannon president.
5.

(R. at 433.)

Showalter had a contract with Coast-Geo Const. Co. in

California for drilling operations for which Showalter would have
made $34,280.00 profit, had it not been for Cannon allowing the rig
to be lost.
6.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.)

An agreement was entered into between Showalter's agent

and Cannon for Cannon to transport the rig to a job site north of
the Hearst Castle in California.

(R. at 433.)
3

7. While en route to the job site, Cannon negligently allowed
the rig to break free from the transport trailer and the rig was
lost down a canyon, destroying the rig.
8.

(R. at 430-31.)

Cannon voluntarily commenced repairs to the rig.

As of

the date of trial, he had spent over $321,000.00 towards the repair
of the rig.
9.

(Tr. at 103.)

Showalter brought suit seeking the value of the rig, lost

profits, interest and costs.
10.

A trial was held, Judge Harding of the Fourth District

presiding.
fault.
11.

Judge Harding found Cannon to be one hundred percent at

(R. at 429.)
The trial court

Showalter to be $97,000.00.
12.

(R. at 1.)

found the total damages

suffered by

(Tr. at 430.)

On February 22, 1993, Cannon made a motion to amend the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to have the court award the
drilling rig to Cannon.
13.

On March

(R. at 438.)

15, 1993, Showalter

filed

an objection

to

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or in the alternative a
motion for additional trial on the issue of damages pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14.

(R. at 459.)

The trial court then awarded the drilling rig to Cannon.

(R. at 541.)
15. Various other pleadings were filed, the trial court making
its ruling May, 1993.

(R. at 587.)

16. Notice of Appeal was filed on June 16, 1993.

4

(R. at 594.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court found the total damages suffered by Showalter
as the result of Cannon's negligence to be $97,000.00, this being
the purchase price of the drilling rig plus $10,000.00 for the
customs charge.
It is Showalter's argument that in assessing the amount of
damages, the trial court neglected pertinent elements found in the
evidence.
the

First of all, Showalter made certain modifications to

rig which

the court

did

not

recognize.

The

court

also

disregarded the testimony of every witness who testified as to the
rig's value. The court also disregarded clear and certain evidence
regarding lost profits suffered by Showalter.
Showalter was extremely fortunate to find a drilling rig for
the price he paid that had the unique features and capabilities as
the one destroyed.
and

gave

it

to

The trial court took Showalter's good fortune

Cannon,

in

essence

rewarding

Cannon

for

his

negligence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
IN ESTABLISHING A VALUE FOR SHOWALTER'S DRILLING RIG
At issue here is the value of the drilling rig.

The trial

court found that the value of the drilling rig was the initial
purchase price of $87,000.00 plus $10,000.00 to get the rig through
customs, for total damages of $97,000.00.

(R. at 430.)

It is true

that the initial purchase price of the rig was $87,000.00 and there
was another $10,000.00 spent to get it through customs.
5

(Tr. at

474.)

The base purchase price and the customs charge is all of the

evidence that can be found to support the trial court's finding of
damages.

It is Showalter's argument that the trial court ignored

or disregarded clear evidence that shows the value of the drilling
rig was indeed much higher than the purchase price and that the
damages suffered as a result of Cannon's negligence are much more
than the $97,000.00 found by the trial court.
The trial court found that the laws of the State of California
applied to the lawsuit.

(R. at 430.)

Under California law, the

damages for an action in tort is the amount which will compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused by the breach of the
obligation,

whether

it

could

have

been

anticipated

or

not.

California Civil Code Section 3333 (West 1982.)
As recognized in the California case of Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Mounteer, 66 Cal. App. 3d 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), the
general

rule

for tortious

injury to personal

property

is the

difference between the market value immediately before and after
the injury, or reasonable costs of repair if that is less than the
diminution in value. See also Smith v. Hill, 237 Cal. App. 2d 374.
(Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
company

that brought

Pacific Gas & Elec. involved a utility
suit against a defendant who

negligently

allowed his vehicle to collide with a utility pole which supported
the Plaintiff's transmission line.

66 Cal. App. 3d at 811.

The

court stated that the rule stems from the measure of tort damages
which

is

the

amount

which will

proximately caused thereby.

£d.

compensate

for

all

detriment

in Lauder v. Jobe, 68 Cal. Rptr.
6

63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) the court held that in the absence of
contrary

testimony, the purchase price of a vehicle would be

sufficient upon which to base a damage award.

Id. at 65.

Lauder

involved an automobile accident and consequently an issue as to the
value of a destroyed

automobile.

Id. at 64.

The defendant

appealed the trial court's finding that the purchase price was the
value of the vehicle.

The appellate court held that because there

was no contrary evidence presented at trial, the purchase price was
a sufficient basis upon which to place a value.

Icl. at 65, 66.

In the present case, there was overwhelming evidence at trial
presented by both sides to show that the value of the drilling rig
was much higher than the purchase price of $87,000.00. First, the
owner, Showalter, testified that in his opinion, the rig was worth
$600,000.00 because that is what one like it would cost to buy in
the United States.

(Tr. at 456.)

Showalter felt that it was a

good deal at $87,000.00 and that was why he participated in the
purchase of the rig.

(Tr. at 456.)

Joe Carl, an expert witness,

testified that the replacement value of a rig such as the one
destroyed in this case would be $600,000.00.

(Tr. at 149.)

Carl

Martin, who at one time had an ownership interest in Showalter's
rig, valued it at $650,000.00 - $700,000.00.

(Tr. at 382.)

Implicit in Defendant Cannon's testimony was that he also
valued the rig for much more than $87,000.00. He testified that he
voluntarily spent over $321,000.00 towards the repair of the rig as
of the date of trial.

(Tr. at 103.)

Why would Cannon spend this

amount on the rig if he believed the value to be much less?
7

Cannon

also testified that he insured the rig for $151,000.00.

(Tr. at

487.) When asked how he arrived at that value, he stated:
my own judgment on that."

"I made

(Tr. at 487.)

Cannon's expert, John Lacy, testified that the value of the
rig was $62,250.00.

(Tr. at 283.)

Lacy, however based this value

on taking the rig's purchase price and applying twenty-five percent
depreciation.

(Tr. at 283.)

analysis is inherently

It is Showalter's argument that this

flawed.

The analysis is based on the

premise that the actual value of the rig at the time of purchase
was the purchase price. In other words, the same analysis could be
applied to a purchase price of one million dollars and a value of
over

$700,000.00

testimony

would

presented

be

arrived

that drilling

at.

Moreover,

there

rigs of this type

appreciate in value rather than depreciate.

was

actually

(Tr. at 192, 209.)

On cross-examination Lacy testified as to the value of some of
the components

of the rig.

Lacy

stated

a hoist would

cost

$25,000.00 (Tr. at 305); $20,000.00 for an engine (Tr. at 306);
$150,000.00 for a hydraulic system (Tr. at 306-07); $15,000.00 for
a rotary table (Tr. at 308); $50,000.00—$100,000.00 for a derrick
(Tr. at 310); $50,000.00 for a bearing (Tr. at 311); $7,000.00 each
for torque converters (Tr. at 311); etc. And there were many other
expensive components that made up the rig that Lacy never testified
to.

Indeed,

as was

mentioned

above, Cannon

had

spent

over

$321,000.00 in an attempt to replace some of the components as of
the date of trial and the repairs were still incomplete.
312.)
8

(Tr. at

Another expert, Stanley Anderson, also one of Cannon's expert
witnesses, testified in a deposition that a rig with comparable
applications to the one destroyed would cost $425,000.00.
609; Deposition of Stanley Anderson at 13-14.)

(R. at

Anderson also

testified that he had put $200,000.00 into rebuilding a similar
rig.

(Id. at 22.)
Finally, Showalter had spent, in addition to the purchase

price and customs charges, another $12,800.00 for modifications to
the rig.

(Tr. at 219, 227, 449.)

These modifications were in

addition to the purchase price of $87,000.00 and the customs price
of $10,000.00. It should be noted that Cannon also spent $6,000.00
for augers that are used on the rig.

(Plaintiff's exhibit 47.)

This expense however is shown as a check written out to Carl
Martin.

The court refused to accept this exhibit.

(Tr. at 471.)

Utah law on damages for the destruction of personal property
is measured by the market value at the time of the destruction.
This rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Winters v.
Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978).

Winters involved

a plaintiff who entrusted a bracelet for repairs to the defendant
jeweler.

Id. at 454. The bracelet was subsequently lost or stolen

from the defendant.

£d.

The trial court returned a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $8,180.00 plus costs and
interest.

Id.

The defendant appealed, claiming that the award of

damages was excessive.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

The general rule is that damages awarded for personal
property that is taken or destroyed are based on the
item's market value at the time of the taking or
destruction. Ordinarily, market value is defined as the
9

price for which an article is bought and sold and for
which there exists a demand in the market place, and the
legal definition of the price is retail, not wholesale.
If however there is no demand for the item, the recovery
is based on actual value, or in the case of unique
chattels, value to the owner.
Id.

(Citations omitted.)

(Emphasis added.)

The record shows absolutely that Showalter's drilling rig was
a unique item.

(Tr. at 128, 146, 148, 189, 216, 221, 230.)

The

rig was uniquely constructed as to enable it to perform difficult
drilling operations.

Id.

Showalter, the owner, testified that he

felt the rig was worth $600,000.00 right before it went down the
canyon.

(Tr. at 456.)

Showalter spent large sums of money beyond

the initial purchase price and customs charge.

Exhibit 47, which

the trial court refused to admit, is documentation as to some of
the monies spent by Showalter towards the rig. He spent large sums
of money on his agent, Carl Martin, who was the operator of the
rig.

Showalter did this because he felt he could recapture all of

his capital and make significant profits if he sold the rig or by
using the rig for construction jobs.

(Tr. at 457-63.)

Evidence of

the rig's profit potential was exhibited by the profit it made or
would have made but for Cannon losing the rig.

The job for Cannon

in Arizona provided Showalter with a net profit of $32,437.00.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 53.)

Showalter would have made an additional

$34,280.00 profit on the Coast-Geo job.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 52.)

Again, the value of this unique chattel to Showalter, as owner, was
$600,000.00.

(Tr. at 456.)

Assuming arguendo that Showalter's rig is not determined to be
a unique chattel, clear and certain evidence is found in the record
10

to show that replacement cost for a rig that would have some of the
same capabilities as the one destroyed would be $425,000.00 or
more.

Cannon's own expert witness, Stanley Anderson testified to

this.

(R. at 609 - Deposition of Stanley Anderson at 13-14.)

Another of Cannon's expert witnesses, John Lacy testified as to
some

of

the

$400,000.00

component
(Tr.

at

costs

on

the

305-11.)

rig

Cannon

being

in

himself

excess
spent

of

over

$321,000.00 in an attempt to repair the rig, and the repairs were
still incomplete.

Joe Carl, Showalter's expert, stated that the

rig was worth $600,000.00 before it was destroyed.

(Tr. at 149.)

Additionally, Carl Martin stated the rig's value was $650,000.00 $700,000.00.

(Tr. at 382.)

In summary of this point, the only evidence in the record to
support the trial court's finding of the rig's value and ultimately
of Showalter's damages in this case is the rig's initial purchase
price plus the customs charge.

Even this finding was in error,

however, because of Showalter's modifications. Every witness that
testified as to the rig's value stated it was worth more than the
value the trial court found.
his

purchase.

The

trial

Showalter simply made a good deal on
court's

finding

of

value

and

its

subsequent award of the rig to Cannon took Showalter's good deal
and gave it to Cannon.

By awarding the rig to Cannon, the trial

court in essence rewarded Cannon for his negligence.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED CLEAR AND CERTAIN EVIDENCE
AS TO THE LOSS OF SHOWALTER'S FUTURE PROFITS
The trial court found that Showalter's business was a new
11

business

and

that

damages

suffered

due

speculative and therefore, not recoverable.

to

lost

profits

were

(R. at 430.)

California law provides that lost profits are recoverable in
an action based on injury to personal property.

In J'Aire Corp. v.

Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court
recognized a plaintiff's right to lost profits in a case such as
the present one.

J'Aire Corp. involved a claim for lost profits

resulting from a delay in completion of a construction project at
plaintiff's restaurant.

Id. at 62.

The court stated that where

negligent conduct causes injury to real or personal property, the
plaintiff may recover damages for profits lost during the time
necessary

to

repair

or

replace

the

property.

Id.

at

63.

(Citations omitted.)
In this case Cannon was found one hundred percent at fault in
causing the injury to Showalter's rig.

(R. at 429.)

Cannon

damaged the rig while transporting the rig to one of Showalter's
job sites in California.

Showalter testified at trial that in one

year he would have made a net profit of $112,600.00 from the rig
using it only part time.
with

Coast-Geo

(Tr. at 460.)

Contractors,

operations using the rig.

Showalter had a contract

Inc. to perform

certain

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.)

drilling
Showalter

would have made $34,280.00 profit on this job had it not been for
Cannon's negligence which caused the destruction of Showalter's
rig.

(Id.)

The loss of future profits as to this contract with

Coast-Geo was clear and certain, with no element of speculation.

12

It

appears

that

the

trial

court

completely

disregarded

this

evidence.
Cannon argued at trial, and it is anticipated that he will
argue again on appeal that Showalter's contract with Coast-Geo was
unenforceable

because Showalter

had not obtained

a California

construction permit as of the date of the accident.

Showalter

testified at trial, however, that he was going to operate under
Coast-Geo's permit.

(Tr. at 467.)

Even assuming, arguendo,,

however that Showalter could not sue to enforce the contract, he
still would have had an action in quantum meruit against Coast-Geo
should it have chosen not to honor the contract.

It is patently

unfair and unjust to allow Cannon to escape liability for clear and
certain damages merely because he speculates as to Showalter's
chances of not getting paid.
Further certainty of Showalter's lost profits was the profit
Showalter
himself.

had

previously

made

on

a

job performed

for

Cannon

On that job, Showalter made a net profit of $32,437.00.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 53.)

Cannon also had a job for Showalter's

rig in Saguaro, New Mexico that Cannon wanted to do after the rig
was repaired.
Although

(Tr. at 267-8.)
it could be conceivably

argued that

Showalter's

business was new, his business had shown a healthy profit on the
job for Cannon and would have done so again on the Coast-Geo job as
well.

Even assuming however, that profits on future jobs were not

certain, the job with Coast-Geo was certain as were the profits.
At

a

minimum,

the

trial

court
13

should

have

allowed

for

the

$34,280.00 net profit Showalter would have made but for Cannon's
negligence which caused the loss of the rig.
POINT III
SHOWALTER'S REQUESTED DAMAGES
Showalter requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
finding of damages and assess an amount that is commensurate with
the evidence adduced at trial. This amount should reflect the true
value of the rig, lost profits and costs.
Showalter asserts that the value of the rig was $600,000.00 as
he testified as owner of this unique chattel.

(Tr. at 456.)

Joe

Carl, an expert witness, also testified that the rig was worth
$600,000.00.

(Tr. at 149.)

$650,000.00-$700,000.00.

Carl Martin stated the rig was worth
(Tr. at

382.)

John Lacy,

Cannon's

expert, on cross-examination testified as to some of the components
that made the rig.

(Tr. at 306-11.)

Following Lacy's testimony to

its logical conclusion, it would also indicate a value in excess of
$600,000.00.
the

In the alternative, a cost of a rig that had roughly

same drilling

$425,000.00.

as did

Showalter's

would

cost

This figure was testified to by Cannon's expert,

Stanley Anderson.
13-14.)

capabilities

(R. at 609; Deposition of Stanley Anderson at

The final repair value would be close to $400,000.00, as

Cannon had spent $321,000.00 as of the date of trial and the
repairs were still incomplete.

(Tr. 312.)

The modifications and

expenditures on the rig should also be added.

This amount being

$16,800.00, the cost of modifications to the rig and the augers.
(Tr. at 219, 227, 449; Plaintiff's Exhibit 47.)

14

Additionally, the

customs charge of $10,000.00 should also be granted.

(Tr. at 430.)

In summary as to the value of the rig, Showalter asks that this
Court grant a value of $600,000.00 to the rig, or alternatively
$425,000.00.

In addition to either of these values, this Court

should also allow for the customs charge of $10,000.00 plus the
modifications of $16,800.00.
Next, Showalter requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's finding that there were no damages attributable to lost
profits.

Showalter asks this Court to find lost profits in the

amount of $112,600.00, this figure representing the net profit for
one year.
the

lost

(Tr. at 460.)
profits

$34,280.00.

from

In the alternative, Showalter requests
the

Geo-Coast

job

in

the

amount

of

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.)
CONCLUSION

Showalter purchased the drilling rig at what he felt like was
an excellent buy, in light of the uniqueness of the rig.

He spent

large sums of money modifying the rig and financing his agent to
arrange drilling

jobs.

He put

forth this additional

capital

because he felt the rig's value to be many times more than the
purchase price and that through either selling the rig or using it
on drilling jobs, Showalter would retrieve his capital plus a large
profit.

The jobs the rig performed proved this theory correct.

Every witness who testified stated the rig was worth more than
the

purchase

price.
repair

Cannon
the

himself

rig

the

repairs

spent
were

over

$321,000.00

to

incomplete.

The trial court disregarded every witness' testimony
15

and

voluntarily

still

and

assigned

the

purchase

price

as

the

rig's

consequently, as Showalter's measure of damages.

value

and,

The trial court

also disregarded the clear and certain profits Showalter would have
made had Cannon not lost the rig.
By the trial court disregarding clear and convincing evidence
as to Showalter's damages, the court took Showalter's good deal and
gave it to Cannon.
court's

This Court must accordingly reverse the trial

finding of damages, and assess damages in the amounts

requested.
DATED this

] l|

day of December, 1993.

hi
LONI F. DeLAND
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

1 If

day of December, 1993, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed with postage
prepaid fully thereon, to Lynn B. Larsen, 1000 Kennecott Building,
10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113.
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ROBERT M. MCRAE, #2217
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-1666
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. SHOWALTER,
C O M P L A I N T

dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING,
C i v i l No.

1 "Z-O^O-Q / 0 S

Plaintiff,
Judge

vs.
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC.
a Ohio corporation, and
JOHN P. CANNON, individually,
Defendant.

Plaintiff

complains

of

defendants

and

alleges

as

follows:
1.

Defendant

corporation

is

incorporated

laws of the State of Ohio and is qualified

to

do

under the

business

in

the State of Utah.
2.

John

S.

Cannon is the authorized registered agent

of the corporate defendant in the State of Utah.
3.
authorized

On or about December 6, 1991, John P. Cannon
agent

of

defendant

A.

as

an

corporation was transporting a

drilling rig from Kayenta, Arizona to California as

a

contract

carrier.
4.

John

P.

Cannon

negligently

operated a tractor -

lowboy trailer in such a fashion to let the rig break

loose

of

its attachments and fall down a canyon.
5.

The

rig

in

question

has

been

damaged

beyond

reasonable repair.
6.

The value of replacing

said

rig

is

approximately

ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00).
7.

Plaintiff

has

lost

substantial earnings from the

loss of said rig in amounts to be determined

by

the

trier

of

fact.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiff

defendants jointly and severally
DOLLARS

($1,000,000.00)

being

requests
in
the

and loss of profits in amounts to be
of

facts,

interest,

costs

and

the
value

judgment
sum

ONE

other

by

the

relief

equitable and just.
DATED this N

MILLION

of the drilling rig

determined
such

of

against

day of February, 1992.
McRAE & DeLAND

ROBERT M. MCRAE
Attorney for Plaintiff

trier
as

is

r- -. '!
t

FEB
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. SHOW ALTER, dba ROCKY
MOUNTAIN DRILLING,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 920400108 PD

vs.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., an Ohio
corporation, and JOHN P. CANNON,
individually,
Defendants.

After full consideration of the evidence and oral arguments presented at the trial of
this case, the Court finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about December 1, 1991, plaintiff had in his employment and under his
supervision Carl D. "Pete" Martin at all times relevant herein and who is admitted agent of
plaintiff.
2. Said Martin had been working an auger drill rig owned by plaintiff which had
B.

been under contract with defendants in Kayenta , Arizona.
3. On or about, but prior to December 6, 1991, plaintiffs agent, Martin, entered
into a verbal agreement with defendants to transport plaintiffs drill rig from Kayenta,
Arizona to a location on U.S. Highway 1, north of San Simeon and north of the Hearst
Castle, California, to a road location currently under construction with the State of California
for an agreed price of $5,250.00.
4. The cost of the transportation was to be deducted from monies owed by
defendants to plaintiff for the Kayenta, Arizona job.
5. Defendants were licensed by the Federal DOT as licensed contract carriers of
goods in interstate commerce.
6. During the course of transporting plaintiffs drill rig, the individual defendant
Cannon was operating said tractor lowboy /trailer combination on behalf of the corporate
defendant.
7. Prior to commencing the haul from Arizona to the designated location in
California, Defendants obtained all of the necessary permits and selected the route to travel.
8. Cannon's own notes verify he knew the location of the job-site to the north of
San Simeon and the "Hearst Castle."
9. Messrs. Cannon and Martin had agreed that Mr. Martin would meet Mr. Cannon
on California Highway 1 at San Simeon to show Mr. Cannon the jobsite.
10. On the afternoon of December 6, 1991, Mr. Cannon met Mr. Martin at his
motel in San Simeon, California as had been previously arranged.
11. Mr. Martin drove ahead of Mr. Cannon along Highway 1 from San Simeon.
12. Thereafter, Mr. Cannon passed a sign which read "TRACTOR - SEMIS OVER

30 FEET KINGPIN TO READ AXLE NOT ADVISED - NEXT 88 MILES." Mr. Cannon
continued to follow Mr. Martin. This tractor-trailer combo was 101'4".
13. During the course of travel on U.S. Highway 1, defendants drove their
tractor/trailer combination in such a way as to lose the loaded drill rig down a canyon side,
damaging the subject drill rig.
14. Defendant's operation of the truck/trailer combination by failing to use mirrors to
assist with guiding the tractor/trailer unit, permitting the left rear to be suspended in mid air
were in violation of the duties of an ordinary prudent trucker holding himself out as a
common carrier of the type of equipment being transported.
15. From April of 1990 to December of 1991 plaintiff attempted to use the rig on
several construction projects. Most of the projects fell through, but plaintiff was able to
obtain work on two projects. Plaintiff paid $40,000 to another company to obtain the other
company's right to the work.
16. In the winter of 1990/1991, plaintiff spent approximately $12,000 for a rig
maintenance repair and regearing. Repair included the stopping of leaking hydraulic fluids.
17. Mr. Showalter was willing to sell the rig for what he had invested in it.
18. Plaintiff never made any money from the rig, his costs being greater than his
income.
19. Plaintiff was attempting to sell the rig but had been unable to do so.
20. Plaintiffs business was new and not well established.
21. Plaintiff has been damaged as follows:
a. For the total loss of the subject drill rig having a value of $97,000
(purchase price plus customs and shipping costs).

22. The Court finds that Defendants undertook repairs of said drill rig at their own
expense and without any authority from the plaintiff, and therefore any claims asserted by
defendants against plaintiff by virtue of their counterclaim are without merit.
23. The Court further finds that repairs undertaken to date by defendants have been
inadequate and no tender has been made to plaintiff by defendants of a totally restored drill
rig to its former condition prior to defendants' negligent damages.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court having made the foregoing findings of fact now enters its conclusions of
law as follows:
1. The laws of the State of California apply to this lawsuit.
2. Defendants are guilty of negligence in the operation of their tractor/trailer
combination in driving the same off the travel portion of the road and failure to observe
proper safety techniques such as the use of rear view mirrors to insure a safe path of travel.
3. Having found that plaintiffs business is new and unestablished, the court
concludes that plaintiffs business losses are too speculative for recovery:
In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a business, either by
breach of a contract or commission of a tort, the law makes a distinction
between established and new businesses, in keeping with the general rule that
such damages, in order to be recoverable , must be reasonably certain and not
speculative or remote. . . .
A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business, either
from a breach of contract or from the commission of a tort, is considered too
uncertain to merit compensation.
23 CAL. JUR. Damages § 81 (citations omitted).
4. Plaintiff has sustained general damages for the value of the drill rig in the sum of
$97,000.

5. Applying California's "pure" comparative negligence standard, the Court
concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants the total damages sustained
by the plaintiff as a result of the accident times the percentage of defendants' negligence.
Having found that defendants were 100% negligent, and that plaintiff was not negligent, the
Court concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full sum of $97,000 from the
defendants.
6. Plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of occurrence, December 6, 1991,
until date of judgement as provided by California law, together with costs of suit.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare a judgement within 15 days of this decision in
accordance with the foregoing findings and conclusions and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.

Dated this 1st day of February, 1993.

cc:

Robert M. McRae, Esq.
Lynn B. Larsen, Esq.
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq.

Lynn B. Larsen #3906
LARSEN & STEWART
1000 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5300
Gregory J. Sanders #2858
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER,
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING
Plaintiff,
-v-

]I
]

MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;
;1

Civil No. 920400108PD

I

Judge: Ray M. Harding

CANNON STRUCTURES, INC.,
an Ohio corporation, and
JOHN P. CANNON, individually
Defendants

Defendant Cannon Structures, Inc. (Cannon) moves the
court to amend its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to
specifically address Defendant's entitlement to the damaged rig
which, in Plaintiff's words

,#

has been damaged beyond reasonable

repair." (Complaint f 5).
In support of said motion Defendant notes that the court
found Plaintiff had been damaged

for the total loss of the drill

rig; that the drill rig had a value of $97,000; and that Plaintiff
was entitled, therefore, to recover the full sum of $97,000 from
C.

the Defendants. (Findings K 21 and Conclusions J5 4 and 5 ) .
With the obligation of Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff
for the full value of the damaged rig, then the rig and whatever
salvage value it may have belongs to the Defendants.

To avoid any

question that may arise in the future in this regard, Defendants
respectfully request that the court either amend its Findings and
Conclusions or address the issue in the Judgment.
Furthermore, as more

fully discussed

in Defendants'

objection to the Plaintiff's proposed form of judgment, prejudgment
interest is not appropriate under "California Law," in this case.
See Polster v. Swing, 210 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985) and cases cited
therein. (Copy attached to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's
Proposed Form of Judgment.)
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 1993.
LARSEN & STEWART

(jLynnl B'/^Larsen
^10 East South Temple, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Counsel for Defendants
cannon\4105p.19
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I had served a copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the
below listed this 22nd day of February, 1993, by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid.
Robert M. McRae, Esq,
McRAE & DeLAND
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078

^^Tt^Cif
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Lynn B. Larsen #3906
LARSEN & STEWART
1000 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5300
Gregory J. Sanders #2858
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER,
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING

]|
]i
i

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FORM
OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
_v-

i

Civil No. 920400108PD

CANNON STRUCTURES, INC.,
an Ohio corporation, and
JOHN P. CANNON, individually ;i

Judge: Ray M. Harding

Defendants

On February 19, 1993, counsel for Defendants received from
counsel for Plaintiff a proposed form of judgment. Defendants
believe that the judgment should be modified in the following ways:
1.

The judgment should specify that the damaged rig now

belongs to Defendants. Following receipt of the courts Findings of
Fact and Conclusion of Law, counsel for Defendants discussed this
matter with counsel for Plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff verbally
agreed to address the disposition of the rig in his proposed form
of judgment. The proposed form does not address that issue. As
D.

such, Defendants respectfully request the judgment form be modified
to indicate Defendants entitlement to the damaged rig.
2.

Plaintiff's claim for interest is excessive. The court

found that Plaintiff was entitled to interest "as provided by
California law." California law allows prejudgment interest only on
"damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation.
. . except during such time as the debtor is prevented. . . by the
act of the creditor from paying the debt." California Civil Code §
3287. In the instant case, Plaintiff sought damages in excess of $1
million for a rig which had cost $80,000 and for which the court
found had a value of $97,000, and from which no profits had been
generated during the year and a half of its use. Such an excessive
claim by the creditor prevented the paying of the obligation and
negates "by California law" any prejudgment interest. See Polster
Inv. v. Swing, 210 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985) where the Complaint sought
$55,000 and damages of $7,836 were awarded. The court concluded
"This large discrepancy is inconsistent with a sum certain or
capable of being made certain at the time of the breach which was
the basis of this civil action." For the convenience of the court,
Defendants have attached to this pleading a copy of the pertinent
provisions of the California Civil Code and the Polster case.
3.

Defendants also object to the alleged "cost of suit in

the sum of $2,492.61" included by Plaintiff

in the form of

judgment. Defendants do not agree with the Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements, as more specifically discussed in the accompanying

- 2 -

motion of Defendants challenging the bill of costs.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 1993,
LARSEN & STEWART

Lyrtni B. M^arsen
10 East South Temple, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Counsel for Defendants
cannon\A105p.20

- 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I had served a copy of the foregoing
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

to the below listed this 22nd day of

February, 1993, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.
Robert M. McRae, Esq.
McRAE & DeLAND
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
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POLSTER, INC. v. SWING
Cite as 210 CaLRptr. 567 (Cal.App. 2 Dlst. 1985)

case this court found prejudice where a
defendant was prevented from testifying
by Beagle error, and his alibi witnesses
could not account for his whereabouts during the entire relevant time period. Similarly, in this case the testimony of alibi
witnesses, though substantially accounting
for defendant's whereabouts, presented
vulnerabilities easily exploited by the prosecution.
Further, in contrast to Fisher, defendant
did not put on a "complete" defense in that
the assertions of Jenkins concerning his
assaultive behavior one week previous to
the incident went unrebutted. The most
logical witness to respond to those assertions would have been defendant, himself;
yet he could have done so only at the peril
of having the jury learn of his prior murder
conviction.
Lastly, the closeness of the evidence and
the existence of sharp conflicts in the testimony herein are additional factors to be
weighed in determining prejudice. (People
v. Anderson (1978) 20 Cal.3d 647, 651, 143
CaLRptr. 883, 574 P.2d 1235; People v.
Underwood (1964) 61 Cal.2d 113, 125-126,
37 CaLRptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937.) In Fisher
the prosecution case was quite strong, consisting of the victim's testimony corroborated by two additional eyewitnesses—one
to events immediately before the crime and
the other to events just after. The notable
weaknesses in the prosecution evidence
herein, particularly the lack of highly credible eyewitness testimony, render this case
considerably closer.
Thus, on the facts of this record and for
the reasons stated above, we conclude that
there is a reasonable likelihood defendant
would have attained a more advantageous
result but for Beagle error at trial.
Defendant's convictions are reversed,
and the matter is remanded for a new trial
consistent with this opinion.
THOMPSON, Acting PJ., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
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jPOLSTER, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Carol SWING; Ronald Swing; Carol's Interiors, Inc., a California corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.
Civ. B004809.
Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 3.
Feb. 6, 1985.
Lessor filed complaint against former
lessee for breach of contract and conversion arising from return of leased premises
in damaged condition. The Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, Robert M. Letteau, J.,
awarded damages plus prejudgment interest to the lessor. The lessee appealed.
The Court of Appeal, Danielson, J., held
that: (1) the state in which the premises
were returned to the lessor clearly breached the covenant to return the premises in
as good a condition as when leased, excepting normal wear and tear; (2) the trial
court properly utilized the estimated cost
of repairs as the measure of damage resulting from the lessees' breach of the covenant to restore; (3) the lessor's act in
renting the premises to successor tenant at
reduced rent could be construed as an attempt to mitigate damages; (4) the lessee
failed to meet its burden of proving that
the lessor failed to mitigate its damages;
and (5) the lessor was not entitled to recover interest from the date that the right to
recover or the breach of covenant vested.
Affirmed in part; stricken in part.
1 Landlord and Tenant <s=»160(2)
While lessee is not obligated to renovate premises at expiration of his lease, or
restore premises to his lessor in better
condition than they were at outset of his
lease, state in which premises were returned to lessor clearly breached covenant
to return premises in as good a condition as
when leased, excepting normal wear and
tear, where record contained substantial

568

210 CALIFORNIA REPORTER

164 Cal.App.3d 427

evidence of damage to dropped ceiling, ceiling tiles, lighting fixtures, ceiling support
bars, interior walls and front door sill and
jamb.

8. Interest <£=39(2)
Prejudgment interest runs from date
when damages are certain or are capable of
being calculated to a certainty.

2. Landlord and Tenant <s=160(4)
Trial court properly utilized estimated
cost of repairs to leased premises as measure of damage resulting from lessees'
breach of covenant to restore premises to
lessor in as good a condition as when
leased, excepting normal wear and tear,
even though lessor itself did not actually
make repairs.

9. Interest <s=19(l)
If debtor does not know or cannot
readily compute damages, creditor must
supply him with statement and supporting
data so debtor can ascertain damages.
West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 3287(a).

3. Damages <s=*62(4)
Lessor injured by breach of contract
must mitigate his damages.

10. Interest <s=19(l)
Where there is large discrepancy between amount of damages demanded in
complaint and size of eventual award, that
fact militates against finding of certainty
mandated in order to recover interest from
date right to recover certain damages vested. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 3287(a).

4. Damages <3=>62(4)
Lessor's act in renting premises previously leased and returned in damaged condition to successor lessee at reduced rent! 11. Interest <S=>19(1)
could be construed as attempt to mitigate]
Amount due lessor was not sum cerdamages.
I
5. Damages «=62(4)
Test as to whether lessor satisfied his
duty to mitigate damages was whether he
acted reasonably and in good faith in relet-J
ting property for less than rent provided in I
original lease after original lessee returned
property in damaged condition.
I
6. Damages e=>62(4)
Lessee failed to meet its burden ofl
proving that lessor failed to mitigate its'
damages sustained when lessee returned
leased premises in damaged condition
where lessor produced evidence showing it
realized that it either had to make repairs
or make rent concessions in successor
lease, and that, under lessor's financial circumstances then prevailing, it would be
better for it to make such concessions.
7. Interest *=>39(2)
Statute which allows person entitled to
recover damages certain also to recover
interest does not authorize prejudgment interest as a matter of law where amount of
damages depends upon judicial determination based upon conflicting evidence.
West's Ann.CaLCiv.Code § 3287(a).

entitlement to interest on damages so that
lessor was not entitled to recover interest
from date that right to recover damages
for return of leased premises in damaged
condition vested, where amount of original
demand was $55,000 and amount eventually found due after receipt of all evidence
was $7,836. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code
§ 3287(a).
12. Appeal and Error <3=*418
Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal is limited in scope to notice of appeal and judgment or order appealed from.
13. Appeal and Error <s=839(l)
Court of Appeal did not reach subject
of court-awarded attorney fees where judgment appealed from made no mention of
attorney fees.

Nathan Goller, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.
Raiskin & Revitz and Steven J. Revitz,
Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent
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POLSTER, I C. v. SWING
Cite as 210 CaLRptr. S<

j42t jDANIELSON, Associate Justice.
Defendants, Carol and Ronald Swing and
Carol's Interiors, Inc. ("Carol's Interiors"
or lessee), interior designers, appeal from a
judgment in favor of plaintiff, Polster, Inc.
("Polster" or lessor) for damages and an
award of pre-judgment interest, for defend|43o ants' failure to return i leased property to
plaintiff in the same condition as received.
We affirm the judgment in part and reverse it in part.
FACTS
On February 5, 1974, Polster and Carol's
Interiors entered into a written lease of a
store located in Sherman Oaks, California
for the term of five years. ^ Carol's Interiors was to conduct a retail furniture store
and interior decorating business on the
premises. The lease provided that the lessee must surrender the premises at the
expiration of the term of the lease in the
same condition as when received, reasonable use and wear thereof excepted. Upon
taking possession, Carol's Interiors remodeled the interior of the premises over a
period of six to eight months for use as an
interior design studio and to display furnishings. During some of that time they
were open for business.
Before the term expired, the lessees informed Polster that they did not wish to
renew the lease and it was agreed that
Carol's Interiors would continue to occupy
the premises until March 11, 1979, paying
pro-rata rental from the date of lease expiration until that date. After Carol's Interiors surrendered the premises, Polster discovered that portions of the interior, including the ceiling, light fixtures, interior walls
and front door were in a state of disrepair
in violation of the lease agreement and so
informed Carol's Interiors.
From November 1978 through the summer of 1979, Polster listed the premises for
lease with real estate brokers. The brokers had difficulty in finding a new tenant
due to the bad condition of the premises
and recommended to Polster that he grant
a repair allowance, rent concessions or a
period of free rent to a prospective tenant
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in order to obtain a new lessee. A new
tenant was finally located and a new lease
was executed, dated September 4, 1979,
providing for free rent until December 1,
1979, or until the tenant first opened for
business to the public, whichever occurred
first. The new tenant took possession of
the property in the same condition it was in
when Carol's Interiors vacated it in March,
and then extensively remodeled the premises to suit its own business needs.
^ On April 30, 1979 Polster filed a complaint against Carol's Interiors and Carol
and Ronald Swing for breach of contract
and conversion, praying for damages of
$55,000.00 and interest thereon, punitive
damages of $100,000.00, and reasonable attorneys' fees.
Trial began on June 30, 1983. On November 1, 1983, the court issued its statement of decision. On November 7, 1983,
judgment was entered for {plaintiff, and on
November 22, 1983, defendants filed thennotice of appeal from that judgment.

h3i

CONTENTIONS
Defendants contend:
1. They did not violate paragraph 5 of
the lease which provided that defendants
had to leave the premises in as good a
condition as when leased.
2. The court did not apply the proper
measure of damages.
3. There was no evidence of diminished
market value caused by the condition of the
premises.
4. Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.
5. Plaintiff should not have been allowed to recover pre-judgment interest, because its claim was not liquidated, as found
by the court.
6. The award of attorneys' fees was
excessive.
DISCUSSION
The Damage To The Property Exceeded
Normal Wear and Tear
[1] Defendant's first contention is without merit The trial court found that the

* AI
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property had been left in a state of "gross
disrepair and disorder" and the record amply supports this finding. The record on
appeal contains substantial evidence of
damage to the drop ceiling, ceiling tiles,
lighting fixtures, ceiling support bars, the
interior walls and the front door sill and
jamb. While the tenant is not obligated to
renovate the premises at the expiration of
his lease, or restore the premises to his
landlord in a better condition than they
were at the outset of his lease (Kanner v.
Globe Bottling Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d
559, 565-566, 78 Cal.Rptr. 25), the covenant
to return the premises in as good a condition as when leased, excepting normal wear
and tear, was clearly breached by the state
in which these premises were returned to
the lessor.
The Court Applied the Correct Measure
Of Damages
Defendant contends that plaintiff may
not recover the reasonable cost of making
repairs to the premises without actually
making the repairs and incurring the attendant expense. Defendant is mistaken.
I432 In Iverson v. Spang\Industries, Inc. (1975)
45 Cal.App.3d 303, 308, 119 Cal.Rptr. 399,
the court described the measure of damages for breach of covenant to restore
thusly:
"The relief to be awarded a prevailing
lessor for breach of a covenant to restore
the premises may be based upon one of
three possible measures: The cost of restoring the premises, the diminution in
the market value of the premises, or
specific performance of the covenant.
[Citation.] In the majority of jurisdictions, including California, the restoration principle is employed; i.e., where an
action is brought after expiration of a
term for breach of a lessee's covenant to
keep the premises in repair or to surrender them in good repair or in a specified
condition, the measure of damages is the
reasonable cost of putting the demised
premises into the required state of repair
or the condition contemplated by the covenant [Citations.] An allowance may
also be made for the loss of rental during

164Cal.App3d431

the reasonable time required to make
such repairs or restoration. [Citations.]"
In its statement of decision, the trial
court found that under Iverson v. Spang
Industries, Inc., supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 303,
119 Cal.Rptr. 399, a proper measure of
damages is the diminution in the market
value of the premises due to the damage
caused by the defendants. The trial court
also implicitly found that where the lessor
did not actually expend money to effect the
necessary repairs but the same were effected by the lessor's agreement with his
incoming tenant, evidence of the estimated
reasonable cost of such repairs is a proper
measure of the diminution in the market
value of the premises. The court also allowed for loss of rental for three weeks,
finding that to be time which reasonably
would be required to effect the necessary
repairs.
Civil Code section 3300, pertaining to the
measure of damages for breach of contract
states, in pertinent part:
"For the breach of an obligation arising
from contract, the measure of damages
. . . is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby, or which, in
the ordinary course of things, would be
likely to result therefrom."
'The measure of damages for a breach of
lease is that established by Civil Code section 3300 in breach of contract cases—an
amount which will compensate the aggrieved party for all the detriment caused by the
breach of which in the ordinary course
would be a likely result." (Guntert v. City
of Stockton (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 131, 142,
126 CaLRptr. 690, 127 Cal.Rptr. 602.)
The Iverson case, quoted above, listed
three possible measures of damages for
breach of the covenant to restore, noting
that in California, the cost of restoring the
premises is employed. (Iverson v. Spang
Industries, Inc., supra, 45 Cal.App.3d, at
p. 308, 119 CaLRptr. 399.) While noting
diminution of value as one of the acceptable measures of damages in the case at
bench, the court j actually employed the es- J**
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timated cost of restoring the premises as
the measure of damages.
The issue then becomes whether the estimated cost of repair can be used as the
measure of the damages which the lessor
has sustained because of the lessee's
breach of the covenant to restore where, as
here, the lessor has not expended money to
effect the necessary repairs but has caused
the same to be effected by the lessor's
agreement with his incoming lessee.
While we have found no California decision directly in point, it has been held in
other jurisdictions that the liability of a
tenant to pay for the cost of repa:n where
he has breached a covenant to repair, is not
affected by the act of a subsequent tenant
who actually makes the repairs, and that:
"(Tjhe view has been taken that the fact
that the landlord has, by an agreement
with an incoming tenant or buyer, relieved himself from expending his own
money upon repairs, does not mitigate
the lessee's obligation to pay damages
for breaching his covenant."
(Annot (1961) 80 A.L.R.2d 983, 1028, § 18
and cases cited; citing Appleton v. Marx
(1908) 191 N.Y. 81, 83 N.E. 563; In re
Jewell (1879 DC NY) F.Cas No. 7302.)
As we have stated above, it is beyond
doubt that plaintiff actually suffered detriment to his property, as reflected by the
condition of disrepair in which defendants
left it
[2] Accordingly, we find that the trial
court properly utilized the estimated cost
of repairs as the measure of damage resulting from the defendants' breach of the
covenant to restore and that the evidence
supports its findings.
Plaintiff Properly Mitigated Its Damages
In Leasing The Premises At A Reduced
Rate
[3] It is settled that a lessor, injured by
breach of a contract must mitigate his damages. (Rubel v. Peckham (1949) 94 Cal.
App.2d 834, 837, 211 P.2d 883.) However,
the burden is on the lessee to prove that
the lessor failed to mitigate. (Chappie v.
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Big Bear Super Market No. 8. (1980) 108
Cal.App.3d 867, 876, 167 Cal.Rptr. 103; 3
Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law, (8th ed. 1973)
Real Property, § 521, p. 2197.)
[4] In the case at bench, plaintiff rented
the premises to a successor tenant at reduced rent. That act may be construed as
an attempt to mitigate damages. (See
Iverson v. Spang Industries, Inc., supra,
45 Cal.App.3d at p. 308, 119 Cal.Rptr. 399.)
Referring to Civil Code section 1951.2, applicable where the tenant abandons the
property before the end of term, Witkin
quotes the Law Revision Commission in its
Comment to that section as follows:
"The duty to mitigate ithe damages will
often require that the property be relet
at a rent that is more or less than the
rent provided in the original lease. The
test in each case is whether the lessor
acted reasonably and in good faith in
reletting the property. [Citations.]"
(3 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed.
1973), Real Property, § 521, p. 2197.)
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[5,6] We find the same general test of
reasonableness to be applicable in this case.
Plaintiff produced evidence showing it realized it had either to make repairs or make
rent concessions in a successor lease, and
that, under his financial circumstances then
prevailing, it would be better for him to
make such concessions.
Defendant has failed to meet its burden
of proving that plaintiff failed to mitigate.
Plaintiff Was Not Entitled To Recover
Interest From March 10, 1979, Based On
A Liquidated Claim
The trial court found that plaintiffs damages were based upon a liquidated claim
because plaintiffs damages were certain,
or capable of being made certain by calculation immediately after defendants vacated the premises, and therefore plaintiff
was entitled to interest at the legal rate
from the date defendants vacated on March
10, 1979.
Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a)
provides, in relevant part:
"Every person who is entitled to recover
damages certain, or capable of being
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made certain by calculation, and the
right to recover which is vested in him
upon a particular day, is entitled also to
recover interest thereon from that day,
except during such time as the debtor is
prevented by law, or by the act of the
creditor from paying the debt
"
[7] This section does not authorize prejudgment interest as a matter of law where
the amount of damages depends upon a
judicial determination based upon conflicting evidence. (Marine Terminals Corp. v.
Paceco, Inc. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 991, 995,
193 Cal.Rptr. 687; Esgro Central, Inc. v.
General Ins. Co. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1054,
1062, 98 CaLRptr. 153.) *
[8] Pre-judgment interest runs from the
date when damages are certain or are capable of being calculated to a certainty.
(Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac.
Transportation Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d
762, 798, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1.)
"[T]he certainty requirement of section
3287, subdivision (a) has been reduced to
two tests: (1) whether the debtor knows
|43s the amount owed |or (2) whether the debtor
would be able to compute the damages."
(Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova
Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d
901, 911, 197 Cal.Rptr. 348.)
[9] If the defendant does not know or
cannot readily compute the damages, the
plaintiff must supply him with a statement
and supporting data so that defendant can
ascertain the damages. (Levy-Zentner Co.
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at 798, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1.)
"[W]here a defendant does not know what
amount he owes and cannot ascertain it
except by accord or judicial process, he
cannot be in default for not paying it"
(Ia\, at p. 799, 142 CaLRptr. 1.)
The Levy case involved damage to real
property by fire. The court found that in
order to apply the statutory requirement of
certainty to the loss of market value of real
property the estimates of expert appraisers
were required to render the damages certain. (Id, at p. 800, 142 CaLRptr. 1.) It
allowed interest from the date on which
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plaintiff supplied defendants with these estimates. (Id., at p. 801, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1.)
In the Iverson case, supra (45 Cal.
App.3d at p. 311, 119 Cal.Rptr. 399), the
court found the amount expended to repair
damage caused by a lessee was not an
amount capable of being made certain within the meaning of Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (a) because, pnor to the entry
of judgment, the defendant could not have
known what it owed plaintiff. It was impossible to tell what portion of costs consisted of damage by prior' lessees, what
portion constituted reasonable wear and
tear, and what portion was caused by defendant.
In this case, there is no evidence that
Polster supplied Carol's Interiors with accurate repair estimates within a reasonable
time after the loss. On March 5, 1979
Polster sent Carol's Interiors a letter reminding it of the terms of the lease and
describing the current unsatisfactory condition of the property, followed by a letter
which described the damage to the property in more detail on March 16, 1979. On
March 10,1979, Carol's Interiors responded
with their own description of the damages
and an offer of settlement. It appears
from the record that expert estimates of
the damages were not prepared until two
and one-half years later, in November of
1981, and it is not clear when they were
received by Carol's Interiors.
[10] Further, the cases indicate that
where there is a large discrepancy between
the amount of damages demanded in the
complaint and the size of the eventual
award, that fact militates against a finding
of the certainty mandated by Civil Code
section 3287, subdivision (a). (See Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p.
910, 197 Cal.Rptr. 348; Marine Terminals Ji**
Corp. v. Paceco, Inc., supra, 145 Cal.
App.3d at p. 997, 193 Cal.Rptr. 687, where
a small discrepancy was deemed unimportant)
[11] In the case at bench, the amount of
the original demand was $55,000. The
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amount eventually found due after the receipt of all evidence was $7,836. This large
discrepancy is inconsistent with a sum certain or capable of being made certain at the
time of the breach which was the basis of
this civil action.
Accordingly, we find that the amount
due Polster was not a sum certain within
the meaning of Civil Code section 3287,
subdivision (a).
The Subject Of Attorneys1 Fees Is Not
Before This Court
Carol's Interiors, appellants in this proceeding, have urged in their brief that the
amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the
trial court is excessive. The question of
attorneys' fees is not before us in this
appeal.
[12,13] The appeal was noticed to be
from "... the judgment entered ... on
November 7, 1983." That judgment makes
no mention of attorneys' fees. Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the
notice of appeal and the judgment or order
appealed from. Accordingly, we do not
reach the subject of court-awarded attorneys' fees in this decision.
DECISION
The judgment as to damages and costs of
suit is affirmed.
That portion of the judgment awarding
interest on damages from March 10, 1979,
to the date of entry of judgment is stricken.
Each party is to bear its own costs on
appeal.
LUI, Acting PJ., and ARABIAN, J., concur.
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jSTURM. RUGER & COMPANY, INC., j£7s
et al., Petitioners,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento
County, Respondent,
Buddy Ray SMITH et al., Real
Parties in Interest.
Civ. 24664.
Court of Appeal, Third District.
Feb. 7, 1985.
Application for writ of mandate was
filed to review the denial by the Superior
Court of petitioners' motion for summary
judgment. The Court of Appeal, Puglia,
PJ„ held that the petition for writ of mandate was not timely filed on December 21,
1984 where the written notice of entry of
the court's minute order denying summary
judgment was mailed to all parties by the
Superior Court clerk on November 26,
1984.
Writ denied.
1. Mandamus <s=>143(l, 2)
In the absence of a specific statutory
provision an appellate court may consider a
petition for extraordinary writ at any time
subject to its discretionary power to deny
relief on the grounds of laches.
2. Mandamus e=»143(l)
Petition for writ of mandate to review
the denial of petitioners' motion for summary judgment was not timely filed on
December 21, 1984 where the written notice of entry of the court's minute order
denying summary judgment was mailed to
all parties by the superior court clerk on
November 26, 1984. West's Ann. Cal.C.
C.P. §437c(Z).

Hoge, Fenton, Jones & Appel, Inc., and
John W. Appel, San Jose, for petitioners.
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CIVIL CODE

706

§ 3281. Compensation for Illegal Act
Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the
person in fault a compensation therefor in money,
which is called damages.
(1872)

§ 3288. Discretion of Jury for Giving Interest on
Certain Damages
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression,
fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury.
(1872)

§ 3282. Detriment—Definition
Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in person or
property.
(1872)

§ 3289. Continuation of Stipulated Interest in
Breached Contract
(a) Any legal rate of interest stipulated by a contract
remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as before,
until the contract is superseded by a verdict or other
new obligation.
(b) If a contract entered into after January I, 1986.
does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation
shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum
after a breach.
For the purposes of this subdivision, the term contract shall not include a note secured by a deed of trust
on real property.
(1872, 1985 ch. 663, 1986 ch. 176 urgency eff.
June 23, 1986)

§ 3283. Award of Damages for Past or Certain
Future Detriment
Damages may be awarded, in a judicial proceeding,
for detriment resulting after the commencement thereof,
or certain to result in the future.
(1872)

ARTICLE 2
Interest As Damages
Interest on Recovered Damages. § 3287
Discretion of Jury for Giving Interest on Certain
Damages. § 3288
Continuation of Stipulated Interest in Breached Contract.
§3289
Prejudgment Interest. § 3289.5
Waiver of Interest Claim. § 3290
Interest Claim in Personal Injury Action—Interest Rate.
§ 3291
§ 3287. Interest on Recovered Damages
(a) Every person who is entitled to recover damages
certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him
upon a particular day, is entitled also torecoverinterest
thereon from that day, except during such time as the
debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor
from paying the debt. This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any such debtor,
including the state or any county, city, city and county,
municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or
any political subdivision of the state.
(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment
to receive damages based upon a cause of action in
contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also
recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry
of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but
in no event earlier than the date the action was fried.
(1872, 1955 ch. 1477, 1959 ch. 1735, 1967 ch.
1230)

§ 3289.5. Prejudgment Interest
For purposes of Section 3289, the rate of the contracted finance charge shall be the legal rate of interest
stipulated by a retail installment contract subject to
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 1801) of Title 2
of Part 4 of Division 3.
(1985 ch. 224)
§ 3290. Waiver of Interest Claim
Accepting payment of the whole principal, as such,
waives all claim to interest.
(1872)
§ 3291. Interest Claim in Personal Injury
Action—Interest Rate
In any action brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained by any person resulting from or
occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation,
association, or partnership, whether by negligence or
by willful intent of the other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and whether the injury was
fatal or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the
complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged as
provided in this section.
If the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section
998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which the defendant
does not accept prior to trial or within 30 days, whichever occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the
legal rate of 10 percent per annum calculated from the
date of the plaintiff's first offer pursuant to Section 998
of the Code of Civil Procedure which is exceeded by

GENERAL PROVISIONS

- judgment, and interest shall accrue until the satisJ ^ n of judgment.
^ J ^ J 5 section shall not apply to a public entity, or to
lablic employee for an act or omission within the
i i c of employment, and neither the public entity nor
J ^ i b l i c employee shall be liable, directly or indirect^•Tany person for any interest imposed by this sec**' (1982 ch. 150)
ijole: This act governs the rate of interest on a judgment
^-ed on or after January 1, 1982, and the rate of interest on
l i f t e r January 1, 1982, on a judgment entered before JanJJ^l. 1982. (1982 ch. 150)

ARTICLE 3
Exemplary Damages
ff^BpUry and Punitive Damages.
ptjlective Order. § 3295

§ 3294

§ 1294- Exemplary and Punitive Damages
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not
rising from contract, where it is proven by clear and
c00 vincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addinon to the actual damages, may recover damages for
Ac sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages purjoant to subdivision (a), based upon the acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had
advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee
mi employed him or her with a conscious disregard of
che rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified
Jte wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice
•Mist be on the part of an officer, director, or managing
agent of the corporation.
(c) As used in this section, the following definitions
shafl apply:
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by
t e defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with
a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of others.
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that
•ejects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in contaous disregard of that person*s rights.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal
rights or otherwise causing injury.

§3295

(d) Damages may be recovered pursuant to this section in an action pursuant to Section 377 of the Code
of Civil Procedure or Section 573 of the Probate Code
based upon a death which resulted from a homicide for
which the defendant has been convicted of a felony,
whether or not the decedent died instantly or survived
the fatal injury for some period of time. The procedures
for joinder and consolidation contained in Section 377
of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to prevent
multiple recoveries of punitive or exemplary damages
based upon the same wrongful act.
(e) The amendments to this section made by Chapter
1498 of the Statutes of 1987 apply to aJI actions in
which the initial trial has not commenced prior to January 1, 1988.
(1872, 1905 ch. 463. 1980 ch. 1242, 1982 ch.
174, 1983 ch. 408, 1987 ch. 1498, 1988 ch. 160)
§ 3295.

Protective Order

(a) The court may, for good cause, grant any defendant a protective order requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of a prima facie case of liability for
damages pursuant to Section 3294, prior to the introduction of evidence of:
(1) The profits the defendant has gained by virtue of
the wrongful course of conduct of the nature and type
shown by the evidence.
(2) The financial condition of the defendant.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the introduction of prima facie evidence to establish a case fendamages pursuant to Section 3294.
(c) No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be
permitted with respect to the evidence referred to in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) unless the
court enters an order permitting such discovery pursuant
to this subdivision. However, the plaintiff may subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at the trial
for the purpose of establishing the profits or financial
condition referred to in subdivision (a), and the defendant may be required to identify documents in the defendant's possession which are relevant and admissible
for that purpose and the witnesses employed by or related to the defendant who would be most competent to
testify to those facts. Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate affidavits and after a hearing, if
the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court
may at any time enter an order permitting the discovery
otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court
finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that
there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294. Such
order shall not be considered to be a determination on
the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shaJI
not be given in evidence or referred to at the triaJ.

ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-1666
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TRIAL

ROBERT D. SHOWALTER,
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC.,
an Ohio Corporation, and
JOHN P. CANNON, individually,

Civil No. 92400108PD
Judge Ray M. Marding

Defendants.
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DATED this

of March, 1993.
McRAE & DeLAND

ROBERT M. McRAE
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy
of the foregoing to the following on this
1993.
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) 1^tfay~of March,

Mr. Lynn B. Larsen
Attorney for Defendant
1000 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, dba ROCKY
MOUNTAIN DRILLING,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 920400108 PD

vs.
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., an Ohio
corporation, and JOHN P. CANNON,
individually,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendants.

The Court has received plaintiffs Amendment to Objections of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (wherein plaintiff essentially reasserts its objections filed March 15,
1993), and defendants' objection thereto. Plaintiff begins his amended objections
complaining that defendants' "objections" (apparently referring to defendant's Objection to
Plaintiffs Proposed Form of Judgement) were untimely and erroneously filed, and therefore
erroneously considered by the Court. Plaintiff is mistaken.
F.

The Court directs plaintiffs counsel's attention to the language of Rule 4-504(2)
CJ.A. which clearly provides for the filing of objections to a proposed judgement within 5
days of the service of such proposed judgement. In the present case, defendant filed his
objections to the form of the proposed judgement on February 22, 1993, after receiving the
proposed judgement on February 19, 1993. Accordingly, the objections were timely filed
and properly before the Court for ruling. In fact, in plaintiffs counsel's letter to the Court's
law clerk, dated March 5, 1993, plaintiffs counsel, himself, indicates that ". . .the form of
the Judgement and Larsen's objections thereto are properly before the Court."
After full consideration of plaintiffs pending objections, the Court overrules all such
objections with the exception of plaintiffs identification of a typographical error contained
in Finding No. 12. The finding should indicate "rear axle" rather than "read axle." All
other objections involve substantive issues which the Court duly considered and rejected prior
to making its factual findings in this case. Moreover, plaintiff has asserted no justifiable
basis for its alternative motion for new trial.
Plaintiff has also filed a "Motion to Add Interest." The motion is clearly
inappropriate in that the Court fully considered and disposed of the issue of pre-judgement
interest under California law in its Memorandum Decision of March 15, 1993. Plaintiff had
adequate opportunity to address the issue prior to the issuing of the Court's decision, and in
fact submitted relevant California cases, to which the Court gave due consideration prior to
making its ruling on the issue.
The Court has also received plaintiffs Amended Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements, and defendants' objection thereto. After full consideration, the Court finds
that all specified costs and disbursements may be appropriately assessed against defendant,

with the exception of the costs for the deposition of Jay Ferris, which was not introduced at
trial and does not appear to have been reasonable necessary for purposes of this litigation.
The Court has now entered final rulings on all issues in this case. The parties are
free to appeal the Court's decision on any issue, if they so desire.
Counsel for defendants is to prepare a judgement within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.

Dated this 20th day of May, 1993.
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